

Lecture 14: Crime and Dispute Resolution in Tanzania

- Part I: Disputes and Crime in Tanzania
- Part II: Origins of Disputes
- Part III: Informal Dispute Resolution.
Sungusungu “Vigilante” Social Control in Tanzania, East Africa
- Part IV: Dynamics and Strategies

Part I: Disputes and Crime in Tanzania


- Property Crime
- Witchcraft and prevention of sorcery
- Interpersonal disputes (slander, debts, etc).

Property Crime

- Like in the U.S., Tanzania citizen experience problems with property crime.
- Pastoralists experience a particular problem; it is easy to walk away with cattle and goats.
- There are few effective police in TZ, and there is extreme poverty. Thus, like with other lectures, I suspect a variety of theoretical positions help explain the origins for this type of interpersonal conflict.

Witchcraft

- People everywhere in the world are concerned about the forces disrupting their lives and, given a chance, they attack the persons who seem to be their source. In Britain and America, child abuse has attracted this sort of attention recently. Elsewhere, the shift from passive stereotyping of other groups to active hostility can be sudden and violent. In much of Africa the object of similar tensions is often witchcraft



Corruption

- Tanzanian state justice system corrupt and inefficient (citizens expect to pay bribes). Tanzania ranks 76th out of about 90 countries on a perceived corruption index.

Part II: *Sungusungu* of Tanzania

- Informal justice organizations
- Emerged in 1982 to combat cattle thieves
- Started by the Sukuma tribe from northern Tanzania (based on traditional institutions and modern institutions)
- Have been legitimized (with some reservations) by the Tanzanian state

Systems of Social Control: Types of Controllers


- Self-help (“cultures of honor”)
- Informal peacemakers
(communities, organizations)
- Formal peacemakers (states)

Controllers: Actors, Rules, Sanctions

- Actors: Individuals (or hierarchies of individuals) who enforce rules with sanctions
- Rules: Primary and secondary rules
- Sanctions: Rewards and punishments

Rules are Culturally Transmitted

- Rules emerge slowly and often diffuse with difficulty to individuals and groups
- Pre-existing institutional rules pre-adapt future institutional arrangements



Methods

- Participant observation, surveys
- Analysis of *Sungusungu* records

Hierarchical Structure of *Sungusungu*

Chief (Ntemi)

Chairman

Secretary

Grand Commander

Committee

Sub-commanders and Rank and File “Soldiers”
(Each commander controls about a dozen young men)











MSINGI
MUYI
D JWA
MERO











Political Units of *Sungusungu*

Village

Ward

Division

District

Region

Nation

Substantive Rules Enforced

- Property theft (especially cattle theft)
- Adultery
- Debts
- Slander
- Violence
- Witchcraft

Analysis of Secondary Rules

- Participation
- Controlling corruption (*Sungusungu* forbids corruption. Extensive monitoring of organizational members to prevent corruption)
- Procedural justice
- Policing behavior
- State/*Sungusungu* relations

Procedural Justice

- Thieves: public display and use of violence (forced confessions and few procedural rules)
- Witches: forced migrations and executions. (procedures extremely secretive)
- Debtors: sophisticated arbitration (council, witnesses, evidence)

Policing Behavior

- Soldiers and leaders prohibited to sell protection or market their services
- Weakening rules near urban areas leading some organizations to behave similar to Mafia organizations

State/*Sungusungu* Relations

- Incorporation of *Sungusungu* into the national justice system
- *Sungusungu* concessions: no guns, fewer murders, meetings with state officials
- *Sungusungu* used by state to collect taxes, protect roads during epidemics, and police illegal beer brewing

CHAGUA CCM KURA KWA MKAPA



CHAGUA
CHAGUA



CCM
PINDA



CHAGUA PINDA NI CHAGUFI YA MACHOPELE
NI MCHAFARAZI NA MCHAGUFI
NI MCHAGUFI NA MCHAGUFI
NI MTU ANAOLECHA KATIKA
JAMU YA KIMATAIFA
NI MTU NA WATA

MUNDO ANAOLECHA KATIKA CHAMA CHAGUFI
LAKINI

MUNDO HORA, CHAFARAZI, MCHAGUFI


MUNDO NA MCHAGUFI

ANATOKA CCM



Scope of Sungusungu

- *Sungusungu* vigilante organizations in distant villages effectively cooperate with other villages to create a **national justice system**.
- Examples:
 - Cooperative ostracisms of entire villages (>10,000 men).
 - Inter-village cooperation to locate stolen cattle



Policing and Group Defense

- Vigilante organizations need many people to participate. The problem is “free-riders” can do nothing and still receive the benefits. Thus, people need to trust that others will participate, or they also will decide they should free-ride to avoid being the “sucker”.

How do the *Sungusungu* resolve their social dilemma?

- The organizations are founded upon sets of rules shared by the Sukuma ethnic group.
- Unlike other ethnic groups (e.g., the Pimbwe), the Sukuma can trust one another across wide social scales.
- Trusts allows for communication, changing payoffs with punishment, and the emergence of altruistic norms (e.g., do it for the good of the Sukuma).

Different ethnic groups have different cultural rules (social institutions).

Pimbwe



Sukuma



Description of Ethnic Groups

	Pimbwe	Sukuma
Economy	Hunter-horticulturalists	Agro-pastoralists
Social Organization	Weak central chiefdom, villages and clans	Multiple chiefdoms, strong village institutions
Ethnic loyalty, pride, trust	Weaker	Stronger

Characteristics of Social Institutions

	Pimbwe	Sukuma
Scope of social institutions	<i>Smaller</i> (village, clans, families)	<i>Wider</i> (cross-cutting ethnic-level institutions; <i>Sungusungu</i>)
Importance of sharing	Stereotyped as being stingy (institutions, economic hardship ?)	Stereotyped as being exceptional generous